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JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER COMPLETE AUTO
TRANSIT: WHEN IS A STATE TAX ON
ENERGY-PRODUCING RESOURCES
"FAIRLY RELATED"?
State taxes levied on goods moving in interstate commerce bring
into conflict two fundamental legal doctrines. On the one hand is the
state's constitutional right to levy taxes in support of valid state
interests - a basic tenet of federalism.' In opposition to that right,
however, stands the commerce clause2 and its implicit commitment to
unobstructed trade among the states.3
This clash between state taxing power and the commerce clause
encompasses all taxes affecting goods within the stream of interstate
commerce-a vast body of law. However, recent fuel production and
energy conservation concerns have highlighted a subissue of growing
importance: a state's right to tax energy-producing natural resources
located within its borders.4 The current trend among resource-rich
states toward substantially increased taxation of their energy-producing
1. See, eg., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 (1977);
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of
Richmond, 249 U.S. 252,257-59 (1919); Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 272
(1872).
2. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. "mT1he Commerce Clause. . . created an area of trade free from interference by the
States." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). See West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U.S. 229, 255 (1911); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITtrrIONAL
LAW 128-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NOWAK]; Browde & DuMars, State Taxation oflAatural
Resource Extraction and the Commerce Clause. Federalisms Mlodern Frontier, 60 OR. L. REV. 7,
12 (1981).
4. See, ag., Browde & DuMars, supra note 3, at 7; . Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the
Commerce Clause: An Historical Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335 (1976); W. Hellerstein, State
Taxation in the Federal System Perspectives on Louisiana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas, 55
TUL. L. REV. 601 (1981) [hereinafter cited as W. Hellerstein, First Use Tax]; W. Hellerstein,
Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation ofEnergy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX. J. 245
(1978) [hereinafter cited as W. Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints]; Lockhart, A Revolution in
State Taxation of Commerce?, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1025 (1981); Madere, State Taxation After Mobil
andExxon, 33 TAX EXECUTIVE 103 (1981).
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resources5 and the concomitant influx of billions of tax revenue dollars
into state coffers6 at the expense of nonresident energy consumers
necessitates a judicial resolution of this subissue.7
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady8 the Supreme Court
devised a four-prong test by which to evaluate state taxes challenged
under the commerce clause. The Court held that a tax is constitutional
if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
State, is -fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State."9
Later, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,10  the Court
interpreted the fourth prong of this test, the "fairly related" element, to
require only that the tax be "assessed in proportion to a taxpayer's
activities or presence in a State."'" Thus, the tax must be fairly related
only to the taxpayer's contact with the state, not to the value of the
services provided by the state.
'This note examines the Commonwealth Edison Court's
interpretation of the "fairly related" standard and the resulting
diminution in the scope of the commerce clause. First, the note
sketches the evolution of the Court's policy toward state taxation of
interstate commerce.' 2 The note then criticizes on both theoretical and
practical grounds the Court's misinterpretation of the "fairly related"
standard.13 Finally, the note proposes a workable method for
5. See Browde & DuMars, supra note 3, at 7; Church, Conflicting Federal, State and Local
Interest Trends In State and Local Energy Taxatior Coal and Copper - A Case in Point, 31
NAT'L TAX J. 269, 278 (1978); Link, Political Constraint and North Dakota's Coal Severence Tax,
31 NAT'L TAX J. 263 (1978); Lockhart, supra note 4, at 1045-59 and cases cited therein.
6. See, eg., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 641 (1981) (Blackmim,
J., dissenting) ("It has been suggested that by the year 2010, Montana will have collected more
than $20 billion through the implementation of this tax.").
Among the many other states enjoying substantial resource tax revenue are Alaska ($29
million from a production tax on natural gas and oil, or 14% of its tax revenue), Louisiana ($548
million from a severence tax on natural gas and oil, or 36% of its tax revenue), Oklahoma ($128
million from a production tax on oil and natural gas, or 14.5% of its tax revenue), and Texas ($664
million from a severance tax on oil, natural gas and sulphur, or 18.3% of its tax revenue). T.
Stinson, State Taxation of Mineral Deposits and Production 20, 25, 39, 41 (Jan. 1977) (prepared
for partial fulfillment of EPA contract EPA IA-G-D6-E766) (figures for the year 1975).
7. See Note, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy Resources: A
Suggested Framework/or Analysis, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 425 (1982).
8. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
9. Id at 279 (emphasis added).
10. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
11. Id at 627.
12. See infra notes 15-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 58-111 and accompanying text.
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determining whether a state's taxes are in fact "fairly related to the
services provided."14
I. DEVELOPMENT OF STATES' RIGHT TO TAX INTERSTATE
COMMERCE
The modem parameters of a state's right to tax interstate com-
merce evolved from more than a century of Supreme Court decisions.
Until recently, however, these parameters had not been well defined, in
part because of the Court's frequent modifications of the principles
from which they were derived. A brief review of the traditional doc-
trine provides helpful background to the most recent change in those
standards, as set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady in 1977.15
In 1872 the Supreme Court established the basis for what has be-
come known as the traditional, or formal, 16 approach to the states' right
to tax interstate commerce. In Case of the State Freight Tax,' 7 the
Court held that a tax on the physical movement of interstate freight
through the taxing state was "in effect a regulation of interstate com-
merce"' 8 and thus a violation of the commerce clause.' 9 The decision
unequivocally prohibited all state taxes affecting interstate commerce,
thus resolving the conflict between the commerce clause and a state's
taxing power decidedly in favor of unfettered interstate trade.
This unqualified support of the commerce clause was short-lived,
however.20 Gradually, the Court adopted the position that certain as-
pects of interstate business were so intrinsic to their places of occur-
rence as to be mere "local incidents" of that business.21 Taxes were not
14. See infra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
15. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The following discussion parallels that found in Browde & DuMars,
supra note 3, at 10-13; W. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court.- Toward a More
UniffedApproach to ConstitutionalAdudication? 75 Micii. L. REV. 1426, 1441-45 (1977) [herein-
after cited as W. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court]; and Lockhart, supra note 4,
at 1027-30.
16. Lockhart, supra note 4, at 1027.
17. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 281. "[W]e regard it as established that no State can impose a tax upon freight
transported from State to State, or upon the transporter because of such transportation." Id. at
281-82.
20. Supreme Court decisions following the strict interpretation of Case ofthe State Freight
Tax were limited to the twenty years following that decision. See Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. v.
Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903); Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Fargo v. Michi-
gan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887); Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Pickard v. Pullman
S. Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885); Moran
v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 (1884); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881); Pensacola Tel.
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877).
21. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Browde & DuMars, supra note
3, at 34.
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subject to commerce clause scrutiny, therefore, if they were directed
toward events that preceded interstate commerce and thus were not yet
within the constitutionally-protected stream of commerce.2 2 In keeping
with this distinction between the local and interstate aspects of busi-
ness, the Court struck down state taxes expressly levied on the privilege
of doing business within that state (privilege taxes) because such taxes
clearly were not imposed on a "local incident" of the business. 23 Not
surprisingly, courts often had difficulty distinguishing local and non-
local incidents,24 thereby creating uncertainty as to when a tax was in
fact levied on the privilege of doing business. As a consequence, courts
increasingly relied on arbitrary classifications of taxes, frequently
favoring form over substance with respect to their constitutionality.25
State taxes also were upheld on the alternate rationale that "[elven
interstate business must pay its way."'26 In Western Live Stock v. Bu-
reau of Revenue, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t was not the pur-
pose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it in-
creases the cost of doing the business."2 7 The Court thus retreated fur-
ther from its earlier doctrine of strict immunity from state taxation of
interstate commerce and exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding the
constitutionality of such a tax. The confusion peaked in Colonial P#e-
22. Browde & DuMars, supra note 3, at 34. See, e.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
335 U.S. 80 (1948); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938); Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245
(1922); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1 (1895).
23. See, eg., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Spector Motor
Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S.
203 (1925).
24. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919). Property, license, privi-
lege and occupation (if levied on intrastate activities), retail sales, net income, compensatory use,
and gross income taxes all were held sufficiently indirect to pass constitutional muster, general
privilege taxes were not. Lockhart, supra note 4, at 1030 and cases cited therein.
25. The Supreme Court acknowledged relatively early in the development of this area of law
that confusion existed:
To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify what has
gone before nor guide the future. Suffice it to say that especially in this field opinions
must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation
with their special facts.
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,252 (1946). See generally Browde & DuMars,supra note 3, at 34;
W. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court, supra note 15, at 1443-44. Also, compare
the progressively strained logic of Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951),
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) and Colonial Pipe-
line Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
26. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919).
27. 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938); see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
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line Co. v. Traigle,28 in which a previously invalidated tax was held
constitutional after a state legislature merely changed the official
description of the tax from that of a "privilege" tax to one covering
"[t]he qualification to carry on or do business in this state or the actual
doing of business within this state in a corporate form." 29
In 1977, the Court abandoned the formalistic analysis used in Co-
lonialPpeline and articulated a four-prong test to determine the consti-
tutionality of a state tax on interstate commerce. The decision inComplete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady30 upheld a Mississippi sales tax
specifically characterized as a "privilege [tax] for the privilege of...
doing business within this state, '31 expressly rejecting the traditional
doctrine on which the plaintiff taxpayers relied. 32 The Court held that a
tax will survive a commerce clause challenge if it is "applied to an ac-
tivity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly appor-
tioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."33 In theory, the Court
completely reversed its approach to a state's right to tax interstate com-
merce. Yet in practice, the Court merely abandoned explicitly a doc-
trine it had ceased to support years earlier.34 No longer must courts
determine whether a tax is levied on goods prior to their entering the
stream of commerce35 or whether it is a forbidden "privilege" tax.3 6
28. 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
29. Id. at 103.
30. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
31. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1972):
There is hereby levied and assessed, and shall be collected, privilege taxes for the
privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this state to be
determined by the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales or gross income or
values, as the case may be, as provided in the following sections.
32. "Under the present state of the law, the Sfpector rule, as it has come to be known, has no
relationship to economic realities. Rather it stands only as a trap for the unwary draftsman." 430
U.S. at 279.
The traditional doctrine was most clearly articulated in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), which declared unconstitutional a state tax on the "privilege of
doing business" within the state by a company engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. The
decision focused solely on the incidence of the corporate net income tax, ignoring its practical
effects. "This formalistic application of the privilege doctrine virtually determined the validity of
a particular tax according to the name the state legislature gave it." Browde & Du Mars, supra
note 3, at 34.
33. 430 U.S. at 279.
34. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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This, in turn, frees the states to compel interstate commerce to "pay its
own way" without resorting to surreptitious statutory draftsmanship. 37
The Supreme Court's most recent application of the Complete Auto
Transit test in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 38 is its only deci-
sion directly addressing the nature of the inquiry to be made when a
state tax is challenged specifically as a violation of the "fairly related"
requirement. Although previous Supreme Court decisions, weighed
the test's. first three elements, they failed to consider the quantitative
correlation between taxes paid and services provided: the Court either
did not reach the fourth prong issue, or addressed it incompletely, de-
ciding only whether any service actually existed for which the state
could tax.39 The Court has defined a universe of compensable state
services, however, broadly stating that such services "include not only
police and fire protection, but also the benefits of a trained work force
and the advantages of a civilized society." 4 Yet, the plaintiffs in Com-
monwealth Edison posed a more specific question: must the taxes paid
be fairly related to the value of the services provided?
Commonwealth Edison involved a Montana severance tax imposed
on the contract sales price of coal mined within the state.41 Although a
moderate severance tax had been in effect since 1921, the plaintiffs42
challenged the tax only after the Montana legislature substantially in-
creased that tax in 1975, imposing an effective rate of up to thirty per-
cent of the statutorily-defined sales price in certain circumstances.43
Plaintiffs sued to recover taxes paid under protest, claiming that the tax
violated the commerce clause as interpreted in Complete Auto Transit.44
The Montana Supreme Court, affirming a lower court opinion, held
37. For examples of such draftsmanship, see Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100,
103 (1975), and Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 603 n.1 (1951). See supra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
38. 453 U.S. 609, 620-29 (1981).
39. The parties in Complete Auto Transit did not dispute the challenged tax's relation to
benefits provided by the state. 430 U.S. at 287. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425 (1980), the Court held, without addressing the fourth prong of Complete Auto Transit,
that a Vermont income tax was not unconstitutional multiple taxation. See also Exxon Corp. v.
Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207,228 (1980); Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434,445 (1979); Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734,
750-51 (1978).
40. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979).
41. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 84-1312 to 1325 (Supp. 1977).
42. The plaintiffs were eleven out-of-state utility companies and four Montana coal produ-
cers. 453 U.S. at 613.
43. Id.
44. Plaintiffs also claimed that the Montana tax was inconsistent with the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.),
and that it frustrated national energy policies, in violation of the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. After analyzing the relevant federal statutes in light
of Montana's taxing power, the Court concluded that the tax did not violate the supremacy clause.
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alternatively that (1) the severance tax was levied on goods prior to
their entering the stream of interstate commerce 45 and thus was not
subject to Complete Auto Transit analysis, or (2) the tax survived scru-
tiny under the Complete Auto Transit test.4 6 The United States
Supreme Court expressly rejected the state court's conclusion that ap-
plication of Complete Auto Transit depends upon a vague determina-
tion of the time at which goods enter the stream of commerce.47 The
Court held, however, that the tax satisfies the Complete Auto Transit
test and thus is consistent with the commerce clause.48
In determining that Montana's coal severance tax is "fairly related
to the services provided by the State," the Court employed a three-step
analysis. First, it stressed that states have a fundamental right to tax to
raise revenues and to recover from interstate commerce its "just share
of the state tax burden. '49 The Court noted that "there is no require-
ment under the due process clause that the amount of general revenue
taxes collected from a particular activity must be reasonably related to
the value of the services provided." It concluded, therefore, that
"[t]here is no reason to suppose that this latitude afforded the States
under the due process clause is somehow divested by the commerce
clause merely because the taxed activity has some connection to inter-
state commerce."'50
In the second step of its analysis, the Court construed the actual
language of the "fairly related" requirement in light of past decisions. 5'
45. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 854 (1980). See supra note 22 and
accompanying text; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v.
Lord, 262 U.S 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
46. 615 P.2d at 856.
47. "We agree that Heisler's reasoning has been undermined by more recent cases.... The
Court has... long since rejected any suggestion that a state tax or regulation affecting interstate
commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny because it attaches only to a 'local' or
intrastate activity." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 614-15. Thus, the Court
overruled Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
48. The Plaintiffs conceded that the tax satisfied the first and second prongs of the Complete
Auto Transit test. 453 U.S. at 617. The Supreme Court held that the tax was is discriminatory (the
third prong) because it is computed at a single rate regardless of the coal's destination or the
residence of the consumers. Id. at 617-20.
49. Id. at 623-24. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. The Court began by adopt-
ing the Montana Supreme Court's characterization of the tax as a "general revenue tax," instead
of a "user tax," id. at 621-22, and based its subsequent analysis on that characterization.
50. 453 U.S. at 622-23. The Court also re-emphasized the breadth of the taxable services that
a state may provide. Id. at 624. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51. These past decisions include National Geographic Soe'y v. California Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435
(1940); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
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The Court concluded that the fourth prong is "closely connected to the
first prong52 .. . [and merely] . . .imposes the additional limitation
that the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of
the contact. . . -53 Therefore, the Court sees the fourth prong only as
an extention of the first; not as a separate element of the test. The tax
need merely be "assessed in proportion to a taxpayer's activities or
presence in a State," 54 and need not be proportional to the value of the
services provided.
Finally, the Court advanced a more practical justification for its
decision. Because of the "difficulty of the judicial undertaking" and
the "nature of the factflinding and judgment that would be required" to
determine "the appropriate level of state taxes," 55 the Court opted to
defer to the state legislatures' determination of the proper tax rate, and
to Congress's ability to supervise those legislatures adequately in keep-
ing with the dictates of the commerce clause.56 The political process
was thus deemed the appropriate forum for resolving the issue. In the
final analysis, it may be this fact-finding burden and the perceived su-
periority of the political process that most strongly influenced the Court
to reject the quantitative method of judicial review proposed by the
plaintiff taxpayers and this note.57
II. COMMONWF.4LTH EDISON'S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE
FOURTH PRONG
It is difficult to discern the nature of the fourth-prong inquiry Jus-
tice Blackmun intended when he authored the majority opinion in
52. The first prong requires that the tax be "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279.
53. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 625-26.
54. Id. at 627.
55. Id. at 628. "[I]t is doubtful whether any legal test could adequately reflect the numerous
and competing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and political considerations that must
inform a decision about an acceptable rate or level of state taxation, and yet be reasonably capable
of application in a wide variety of individual cases." Id.
56. Id at 627.
57. The Commonwealth Edison decision was the product of a significantly divided Court,
with six justices in the majority and three justices strongly dissenting. Justice White wrote a con-
curring opinion joining the majority with some uncertainty:
This is a very troublesome case for me, and I join the Court's opinion with considerable
doubt and with the realization that Montana's levy on consumers in other States may in
the long run prove to be an intolerable and unacceptable burden on commerce. Indeed,
there is particular force in the argument that the tax is here and now unconstitutional.
But ... Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from intolerable or
even undesirable burdens ... [and] Congress is so far content to let the matter rest. As I
presently see it, therefore, the better part of both wisdom and valor is to respect the
judgment of the other branches of the Government.
453 U.S. at 637-38 (White, J., concurring). One member of the majority, Justice Stewart, has since
retired from the Court.
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Complete Auto Transit. The Court did not undertake a fourth-prong
analysis in that case because the parties did not contest the issue.5 8 It
seems likely that the Court's inclusion of the "fairly related" element in
the test, apart from the "substantial nexus" first prong, indicates that
the first and fourth prongs address different concerns. It is possible,
however, that Justice Blackmun did not carefully consider the proper
nature of inquiry to be made under the fourth prong because it was
unnecessary to his resolution of the issue. The opinion itself provides
no clue. No decision prior to Commonwealth Edison addresses a direct
allegation that a tax is unconstitutionally excessive. 59 Therefore, an in-
terpretation of the fourth prong requires an investigation of the basis
for the Complete Auto Transit decision.
A. The Constitutional Basis for the Complete Auto Transit Test
The constitutionality of a state tax on interstate commerce depends
on a balancing of the state's right to raise revenues by taxation against
the national interest in a free flow of goods among the states.60 This
conflict is implicit in the Complete Auto Transit test. The test first as-
sumes the right to tax and then imposes constitutionally mandated lim-
itations on that right. It is important to note, however, that these
limitations derive from two discrete provisions of the Constitution -
the commerce clause 6 and the due process clause62 - which have dif-
ferent purposes. In effect, the Court in Commonwealth Edison relied
exclusively on a due process analysis of the Complete Auto Transit
test,63 thereby ignoring the distinct purpose and indispensable safe-
guards of the commerce clause.
The commerce clause reflects the desire of the Founding Fathers
to ensure adequate domestic markets for goods and services in light of
the problems created by the absence of such a provision in the Articles
of Confederation. 64 Although the Supreme Court's view of the extent
of permissible state actions has varied over time,65 the underlying ob-
jective - prevention of unnecessary interference with free trade among
the states - has remained constant.66 Because a state tax on goods in
58. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 287. See supra note 39.
59. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
60. See supra text accompanying note 3.
61. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See supra note 2.
62. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
64. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 132-33; Browde & DuMars, supra note 3, at 11.
65. J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 134-56. See supra text accompanying notes 16-37.
66. See supra note 3.
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interstate commerce is an interference, 67 it requires scrutiny under the
commerce clause. In contrast, the purpose of the due process clause is
to protect the individual's right to life, liberty and property,68 a concern
more closely related to fundamental human rights than to economic
efficiency. Thus, although both the due process and commerce clauses
require taxes affecting interstate commerce to be related in some man-
ner to state-provided services, they do so in order to achieve different
goals.
The existence of separate constitutional provisions and purposes
should not lead to the conclusion reached in Commonwealth Edison
that both clauses require the same relationship between the tax and the
service provided.69 Indeed, the opposite is implied. The due process
component of the Complete Auto Transit test is merely procedural,70
requiring that there be "certain minimum contacts" between the activi-
ties of the taxpayer and the taxing state.71 The first and second prongs
adequately preserve due process by stating that the tax must be "ap-
plied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State" and
must be "fairly apportioned. ' 72 Commerce clause concerns, however,
necessitate a different kind of inquiry and a closer relationship between
taxes and benefits if the goals of the Founding Fathers are to be
achieved. A tax that passes the due process test but is extremely bur-
densome can be at least as detrimental to free interstate trade as a mod-
est tax levied on goods lacking a substantial nexus with the taxing state.
The commerce clause, therefore, must impose restrictions on states'
power to tax in addition to those required by due process. Complete
67. See generally P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 388-99 (10th ed. 1976); Developments in the
Law, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate BRusiness, 75 HARv. L. Rv. 953, 957
(1962) [hereinafter cited asDevelopments].
68. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 62.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
70. The Court in Commonwealth Edison, in addition to equating the first and fourth prongs
of Complete Auto Transit, see supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text, concluded that "there is
no requirement under the Due Process Clause that the amount of general review taxes collected
from a particular activity must be reasonably related to the value of the services provided to the
activity." 453 U.S. at 622. Thus, deference to the states' "considerable latitude in imposing gen-
eral revenue taxes," id., requires a limited degree of judicial scrutiny when that tax is challenged
under the due process clause - a substantive due process standard. See supra text accompanying
note 50. Substantive due process requires only that a tax be rationally related to a legitimate
government end. J. NowAx, supra note 3, at 410. Again, this approach ignores the distinct nature
of due process and commerce clause concerns. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68. The
interpretation of the fourth prong advocated in this note would require a closer relationship be-
tween taxes and legitimate government purposes than the "rationally related" standard; if the state
can establish this relationship, substantive due process is afortiori satisfied.
71. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319-20 (1945). See Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 251 (4958); Madere, supra note 4, at 119.
72. 430 U.S. at 279. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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Auto Transit's third and fourth prongs, if properly interpreted, would
adequately protect commerce clause interests by directing that a tax
must "not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [must be]
fairly related to services provided by the State. ' 73 The Court in Com-
monwealth Edison incorrectly subordinated commerce clause concerns
to those of the due process clause by concluding that the fourth prong
has no significance independent of the first prong when applied to most
state taxes.74
B. The Case Law Basis of the Complete Auto Transit Test
Since the early 1900's the Supreme Court has recognized a limited
exception to the then general rule prohibiting state taxation of inter-
state commerce, reasoning that "[e]ven interstate business must pay its
way."75 Subsequent decisions analyzing commerce clause restraints ex-
pressly adopted this exception and emphasized the Court's concern
with equity and fairness in the taxing process. The Court in Western
Live Stock v. Bureau ofRevenue ordered interstate commerce to pay its
'Yust share of state tax burden, '76 and in Freeman v. Hewitt declared
that "[s]tate taxation falling on interstate commerce . . . can only be
justified as designed to make such commerce bear afair share of the
cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys."' 77 From these
cases establishing the states' limited right to tax evolved the broader
doctrine of Complete Auto Transit,78 a doctrine rooted in fairness.
Unfortunately, the Court in Commonwealth Edison disregarded its
previous equity concerns. In determining the nature of review required
under the fourth prong of Complete Auto Transit, the Commonwealth
Edison Court seemed content to argue semantics, deciding that com-
73. 430 U.S. at 279.
74. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 625-26. The fourth prong now has
independent significance only "in those cases involving highway use taxes and similar levies desig-
nated as charges for specific state services." W. Hellerstein, First Use Tax, supra note 4, at 617.
See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
75. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252,259 (1919). See supra notes 26-
27 and accompanying text.
76. 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (emphasis added).
77. 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946) (emphasis added). See General Motors Corp. v. Washington,
377 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1964).
78. Note that CompleteAuto Transit and subsequent opinions demonstrate an important shift
in the perspective from which the Supreme Court views state taxes on interstate commerce. The
Court's general rule once was that these taxes are constitutional only in limited and specified
circumstances. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27. Complete Auto Transit reversed the
presumption underlying the general rule by permitting taxes on interstate commerce except in
certain circumstances. This was a strong concession to the states' rights to tax. If the commerce
clause is to retain any vitality in this area, the Court must use caution when establishing rules, as
in Commonwealth Edison, defining the circumstances under which a tax is invalid.
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merce bears a "just or fair share" if the tax imposed is related merely to
the taxpayer's contact with the state, regardless of the actual amount of
the taxes levied.79 Although it pays lip service to fairness, the Court's
conclusion is a triumph of form over substance. A state legislature can
easily design a tax that establishes the Commonwealth Edison relation-
ship to services provided, but taxes at an unconscionably high rate.80
Legislative gymnastics of this kind are precisely what the Court sought
to avoid in Complete Auto Transit.8'
The common meaning of the language advocating equity and fair-
ness, as used by the Supreme Court prior to Commonwealth Edison,
indicates that a proper review of a state tax on interstate commerce
must consider the actual tax burden borne by the taxpayer or, con-
versely, the amount of revenues received by the taxing state. In addi-
tion, the Court's approach to issues closely related to those presented
by the fourth prong illustrates more concretely its awareness of the sig-
nificance of the actual quantitative burden on a taxpayer involved in
interstate commerce. The second prong of the Complete Auto Transit
test requires that a tax be "fairly apportioned" to survive a constitu-
tional challenge. In establishing this element, the Court expressly
sought to minimize the undesirable effects of multiple taxation, that is,
taxation by several states of the same income earned by an interstate
taxpayer.82 Apparently, the Court recognized that such a situation
could easily become so onerous as to be debilitating. Yet as a practical
matter, a single excessive tax can be as burdensome to the interstate
taxpayer as several taxes on the same income. Although multiple taxa-
tion is primarily a due process issue, it does not require a great logical
step to conclude that commerce, as well as due process, suffers when
tax burdens become oppressive.
79. 453 U.S. at 623-24.
80. "Under the Court's reasoning any ad valorem tax will satisfy the fourth prong; indeed,
the Court implicitly ratifies Montana's contention that it is free to tax this coal at 100% or even
1000% of value should it choose to do so.' 453 U.S. at 645-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
82. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272-73 (1978); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. at 282. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 444 (1980);
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 257 (1938); Madere, Supra note 4, at 121-
23.
The second prong derives from the requirements of due process, which are separate from
those of the commerce clause. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. The concern is that
the tax should reach only that income earned from some minimum contact with the taxing state.
The argument made in the text accompanying this footnote is advanced only to show the Supreme
Court's recognition of problems stemming from burdensome taxes affecting interstate commerce.
It is not suggested that multiple taxation concerns are identical to those of the fourth prong.
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Even stronger evidence of the Supreme Court's concern with the
quantitative limits on state taxation is the its approach to state taxes
levied on a nonresident's use of particular public facilities - user
taxes.83 The Supreme Court has made it clear that a user tax is valid
only if it is related to the cost to the state of the benefit provided to the
taxpayer:
[W]hile state or local tolls must reflect a "uniform, fair and practical
standard" relating to public expenditures, it is the amount of the tax,
not itsformula, that is of central concern. At least so long as the toll is
based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use.., and
is... [not] excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit
conferred, it will pass constitutional muster .... 84
There is no reason to limit this standard of review to user taxes.
Admittedly, user taxes are in some ways distinguishable from privilege
and severance taxes. The costs associated with the use of a particular
facility that depreciates at a predictable rate are easier to calculate than
are costs related to the provision of "police and fire protection, the
benefits of a trained work force, and the advantages of a civilized soci-
ety." 85 Indeed, it may be more accurate to categorize the user tax as a
"rent charged by the State, based on its proprietary interest in the pub-
lic property, rather than a tax."8 6 Yet these distinctions do not justify
different standards of judicial review. They address only administra-
tive concerns - the valuation of costs and the determination that tax
revenues are in fact spent on the maintenance of specific facilities -
rather than constitutional distinctions.
83. A "user" tax, as defined in this section, should be distinguished from "compensatory use"
taxes. The former is levied on the nonresident's use of facilities within the taxing state; the latter
are imposed on the "use, storage, withdrawal or consumption of tangible personal property within
the borders of the taxing jurisdiction" when such property would otherwise escape taxation. P.
HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 578 (1981). See generally,
id. at 577-638, 665-74.
The most commonly taxed uses include public highways, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583 (1939); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937), and airports, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). See P. HARTMAN, supra, at 669,
nn. 25-33.
84. 405 U.S. at 716-17 (emphasis added). See P. HARTMAN, supra note 83, at 670.
85. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979). See supra text accompa-
nying note 40.
86. P. HARTMAN, supra note 83, at 665. One may legitimately argue that a severance tax,
such as the one at issue in Commonwealth Edison, is as similar to a rent as is a user tax and thus
deserves an equivalent standard ofjudicial review. Indeed, any tax designed to recover the bene-
fits of a civilized society may be reasonably considered a payment of rent for the use of those
benefits. The Supreme Court was content to accept without question, however, the Montana
Supreme Court's characterization of the severence tax at issue as a "general revenue" tax, not a
"user" tax. 453 U.S. at 621-22. See supra note 49. Although debatable, this conclusion is not
dispositive. The analysis which follows applies to any type of tax levied under the circumstances
noted.
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The Supreme Court, therefore, requires coordination between the
value of benefits provided and the amount of taxes paid only when
such amounts are quantifiable with relative ease and precision. This
has led to arbitrary distinctions between the kind of taxes levied for the
purpose of constitutional review.8 7 Yet, under certain circumstances,
practical considerations might warrant deference to state legislatures'
or Congress's ability to reasonably restrain states' power to tax.8 8 In
the case of taxation of energy-producing resources moved in interstate
commerce, however, deference is improper. The Court has underesti-
mated the importance of judicial review in this area, in light of legisla-
tive ineffectiveness.8 9 Additionally, the Court has overestimated the
difficulties of a factual inquiry into the value of services provided. As a
result, the Court has mistakenly refused to require that taxes be "fairly
related" to the value of services provided.
C. Judicial Deference to State and Federal Legislatures
In adopting a standard of review, a court is influenced both by the
legal issues involved and by the practical difficulties of resolving those
issues.90 This note has sought to demonstrate the absence of an ade-
quate theoretical basis for limiting judicial review of state taxes affect-
ing interstate commerce to a perfunctory determination that the tax is
fairly related to the taxpayers' contact with the taxing state. Practical
considerations are equally important, however, and deference to state
legislatures or Congress is appropriate in some instances.91 Judicial
deference is improper, however, when legislatures are il-equipped to
resolve the issue or have demonstrated an unwillingness to do so. Such
is the case in a narrow but significant subset of state taxation of inter-
state commerce - taxes levied on energy-producing natural resources.
1. Ineffectiveness of State Legislation. The Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Edison concluded that, even apart from the difficulties
of judicial factfinding and subjective determinations, the proper level
of taxation is best left to our two-step political process, which allows
state legislatures to control local taxation subject to overriding federal
legislation action.92 Admittedly, this process works well in certain cir-
cumstances. However, energy-producing natural resources generally
87. See generally P. HARTMAN, supra note 83, at 665-75.
88. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
90. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 24-110.
91. For example, "[pirominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found ... a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it... ..
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
92. 453 U.S. at 628. See supra notes 55-57 accompanying text.
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share two critically important characteristics that make state legislation
an ineffective means of protecting commerce clause rights: (1) the re-
sources are located within limited geographic areas, and (2) nonresi-
dents consume vastly greater amounts of the resource than do
residents.93 The confluence of these factors removes the economic and
political incentives for self-restraint by the states, leading to excessive
taxes at the expense of interstate commerce.
Basic free-market economic theory suggests that market forces will
react to an increased state tax by encouraging production in another
state, if all other factors remain constant. 94 Thus, assuming that the tax
is the only distortion of an otherwise purely competitive market, the tax
will drive taxpayers away from the taxing state, generally to the disad-
vantage of that state.95 Ideally, competitive market forces would limit
state tax rates. Unfortunately, energy-producing resources are not col-
lected and distributed in a market that even approaches the purely
competitive ideal. Rather, the limited geographic locations of energy-
producing resources96 such as coal, oil, and natural gas, give dispropor-
tionate market power to resource-rich states, allowing a taxing state to
act as the monopolistic owner of the resource.97 The state can thus tax
at a much higher rate than it could in a competitive market because
producers must operate within the state possessing the resource.98
93. See 453 U.S. at 639 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (as much as 90% of the coal mined in
Montana is exported).
94. See supra note 67.
95. The state will lose tax revenues, jobs for its residents and such intangibles as good will,
publicity and reputation within the business community.
96. It also may be the case that the resource can be found in many locations, but the quality
of the resource is so varied that production is prohibitively expensive in all but a few locations.
97. Resources may be located within a specific region that encompasses several states, instead
of a single state. This circumstance, not surprisingly, usually produces an oligopoly situation be-
cause of the prevalence of "tax leadership": surrounding states tend to follow one state's tax
increases. "'Tax leadership' in the western states appears to be an emerging reality... . '[Tax
leadership' within some limits [antitrust] among these states can hardly be prevented." Church,
Conflicting Federal, State and Local Interest Trends in State and Local Energy Taxation, Coal and
Copper -. Case in Point, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 278 (1978).
98. A legitimate dispute exists as to who actually bears the incidence of such taxes. It has
been argued that the state, as land owner, bears the burden in the long run. See McClure, Eco-
nomric Constraints on State and Local Taxation ofEnergy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 257, 259
(1978). While this conclusion may be valid, it is apparent that producers and consumers suffer the
tax incidence in the short run. The short run is "short" however, only when compared to the long
run, which is likely to be long indeed. Energy production is a capital-intensive, relatively immo-
bile industry. The result is slow movement between states and a relatively inelastic response to
fluctuations in the cost of production. As a consequence, interstate commerce suffers substantially
from the excessive tax, even if only for the "short run." See Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Tenn, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 107-08 (1981).
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Even so, the political process of the taxing state would operate to
repeal such an onerous tax if the burden were born by those with polit-
ical influence, i.e., resident voters. However, it is more often true that
nonresidents are the primary consumers of the resource.99 They can
exert at best only indirect pressure on the state to lower rates, usually
without success. 1°° It is true that some of the tax incidence will fall on
voters as resident energy consumers and producers. Political pressure
from the electorate will be dampened, however, by the benefits of the
enormous tax-generated revenue enjoyed by the state and its resi-
dents.'0 1 Again, the result is an absence of adequate checks on the tax
rate. Rather, there are financial incentives to impose excessive taxes on
resources moved in interstate commerce. The only political alternative
is an appeal to Congress to restrain states' taxing power.
2. Ineffectiveness of Federal Legislation. Theoretically, when state
taxes on interstate commerce become excessive, the political process
will limit the states' taxing power via federal legislation initiated by
voter protest.10 2 The political machinery is cumbersome, 0 3 however,
and can be further slowed by pressure exerted on Congress by the states
themselves. Both the Supreme Court and commentators have noted
Congress's unwillingness to act on a variety of issues relating to state
taxation of interstate commerce.104 In addition, legislation often may
99. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. "To the extent that the tax burden falls on economic interests outside the taxing State, it
is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation
which adversely affects interests within the taxing State." P. HARTMAN, supra note 83 at 8. See
Link, supra note 5, at 263, 267-68 Developments, supra note 67, at 957, 969.
Although nonresident producers can indirectly affect state decisions, for example, through
political contributions, their influence is almost certainly less than that of the much larger group of
state residents who enjoy the benefits of high taxes on energy-producing resources. See supra note
6 and infra note 101 and accompanying text.
I01. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See generally Church, supra note 97; Link,
supra note 5.
102. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981).
103. Even matters of such national importance and urgency as federal fiscal policies (e.g., the
adjustment of a particular tax rate) apparently suffer from excessive "administrative lags" (the
length of time between initial consideration in Congress and legislative response). That lag has
been estimated at as much as 15 months and is primarily the result of "congressional log rolling
and pressure groups." T. CARGILL, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND MONETARY POLICY
472-73 (1979). There is no reason to expect less delay when Congress tries to resolve issues relat-
ing to the proper taxation of interstate commerce, given the myriad of local interests and the
complex factfinding required.
104. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448-49 (1980); J.
Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 351; W. Hellerstein, First Use Tax, supra note 4, at 619, n.93; W.
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard
Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149, 153 (1976).
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be so much the product of political compromise that it is ineffective or
merely a stop-gap measure.10 5
Furthermore, a ceiling on the state tax rate, would not necessarily
solve the problems. States can easily circumvent such legislation
through carefully worded statutes.1t 6 Implementation of the federal
law would be hampered by the inevitable myriad of legal questions
regarding the scope of the federal legislation, the scope of the state tax,
the effective rate of the tax, the type of tax being limited (income tax,
severence tax, use tax, property tax, etc.) and other bothersome issues.
The judiciary would not escape difficult factual inquiries into state leg-
islative histories or vague subjective determinations that promote in-
consistencies. Finally, an inflexible ceiling would create inequities
among states with differing resource-related costs, and where those
costs exceed the ceiling rate, states would bear costs properly attributa-
ble to nonresidents.10 7 Thus, deference to the federal political process
will not protect interstate commerce from excessive taxation, protect
the courts from difficult determinations relating those taxes, or protect
states from inequitable tax burdens. Federal legislation, like state legis-
lation, is ill-suited to respond effectively to these issues. The judiciary
must bear the responsibility.
3. The Courts' Duqy to Review State Taxes. The Supreme Court
has recognized a general duty of the courts to review the constitutional-
ity of state taxes on interstate commerce. As early as 1919 the Court
stated that "the authority [is] in the courts, on proper application, to
determine whether. . . the charge made is reasonably proportionate to
the service to be rendered and the liabilities involved."108 Several sub-
sequent decisions have recognized this judicial duty to scrutinize poten-
tially unconstitutional state taxes on interstate commerce, rather than
defer to Congress.10 9
105. See J. Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 340.
106. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
107. Note, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation of Energy Resources: A Suggested
Frameworkfor Anaolsis, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 425, 456-57 (1982).
108. Postal TeL-Cable Co. v. City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 260 (1919).
109. "[Congress] generally has left the determination to the courts of what state taxes on or
affecting commerce were permissible and what impermissible under the Commerce Clause."
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 85 (1948).
Some have thought that the wisest course would be for this Court to uphold all state
taxes not patently discriminatory, and wait for Congress to adjust conflicts when and as
it wished. But this view has not prevailed, and the Court has therefore been forced to
decide in many varied factual situations whether the application of a given state tax to a
given aspect of interstate activity violates the Commerce Clause.
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954). See Mobil Oil Corp. v.




The Court, therefore, has noted the importance of judicial review
in addressing subissues of the general area of state taxation - due pro-
cess, fair apportionment, multiple taxation, and privilege taxes." 0
There is no compelling reason not to subject fourth-prong questions to
similar judicial scrutiny. The political process is not an inherently bet-
ter method of balancing a state's right to tax the fundamental protec-
tions of the commerce clause, and may in fact be worse."' The
dangers of state-imposed trade restraints make it incumbent on the
courts, as referees, to ensure a reasonable balance.
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The preceding discussion suggests the pitfalls of depending on
state and federal legislatures to prevent excessive state taxes on energy-
producing resources moved in interstate commerce.112 Yet in Common-
wealth Edison, the Supreme Court deferred to the political process not
only because of its presumed superiority to the judiciary in this area,
but also because of the Court's reluctance to engage in labyrinthian
factfinding designed to "calculate acceptable rates or levels of taxa-
tion."" 3 It is indeed unreasonable to require courts to wade through
reams of data and testimony to arrive at a proper tax rate for every
challenged tax. Such inquiries would undoubtedly lead to arbitrary
and inconsistent results, while court dockets would become intolerably
congested; deference to the superior factfinding skills of a legislative
body would be both preferrable and necessary. However, such exten-
sive judicial inquiry is neither constitutionally mandated, nor suggested
by legal precedent. In fact, a much more manageable review will pro-
tect commerce clause rights without exceeding the judiciary's factfind-
ing capabilities.
A. Approximating the Correlation between Taxes Paid and Benets
Provided
The language of the fourth prong itself suggests that taxes paid
need not exactly equal the cost of services provided by the taxing state.
Taxes must merely be "fairly related" to the services enjoyed by the
taxpayer.1 4 Hence, there need only be an ascertainable "relationship,"
and that relationship must be one which "fairly" burdens the taxpayer;
110. See supra note 109.
111. See supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
113. 453 U.S. at 628.




only approximation, not mathematical precision, is called for. The
Supreme Court has approved similar approximations when considering
various issues within the general area of state taxation of interstate
commerce.11 5 In Commonwealth Edison the Court misperceived the de-
gree of scrutiny necessary for adequate review; it misjudged the preci-
sion required and overestimated the requisite amount of judicial
factflinding. This led the Court to conclude that it could not devise a
legal test- that would both accurately reflect the numerous considera-
tions involved in establishing a proper tax rate and maintain the neces-
sary degree of flexibility.1 6 The Court incorrectly viewed the task as
one of determining the fair tax rate. Instead, the Court need only have
determined whether the state employed good faith efforts and reason-
able computations to arrive at the tax rate imposed - a decidedly more
manageable standard of review.
B. Irrebuttable Presumption of Fair Relationship
The guarantee of free trade inherent in the commerce clause is
inadequately protected when judicial review is denied those state taxes
whose incidence falls on goods (1) moved in interstate commerce, (2)
used primarily by nonresidents of the taxing state, and (3) subject to
monopoly-like control by that state." 7 If the goods are not moved in-
terstate, no commerce clause question arises; if the tax primarily bur-
dens state residents, the state's own political process will militate
against excessive taxes; if the state lacks monopoly-like control of the
good, competitive market forces will compel a reasonably mobile in-
dustry to seek a more favorable economic climate in a lower-tax state,
to the disadvantage of the taxing state. Absent one of these enumer-
ated elements, therefore, the judiciary may properly assume that the
state has set a reasonable tax rate; the scales should tilt in favor of the
state's right to tax and against commerce clause concerns.
A party challenging the validity of a tax on commerce clause
grounds, therefore, must establish all three elements before proceeding
with his case. Failure to prove this prima facie case leads to an irrebut-
table presumption that the challenged tax is indeed "fairly related to
115. See Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 455"(1979) (considering fair
apportionment of taxes); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 405
U.S. 707, 716-17 (1972) (considering user taxes); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542,
546 (1950); International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422-23 (1947); Northwest Airlines
Inc., v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 325 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583, 599 (1939); J. Hellerstein, supra note 4, at 347; W. Hellerstein, First Use Tax, supra note
4 at 615.
116. 453 U.S. at 628. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
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the services provided," and the suit should be dismissed. No questions
of excessiveness or calculations of values are considered by the court.
Furthermore, forcing the taxpayer to bear this heavy burden of produc-
tion will protect the defendant states and the judicial system from a
deluge of meritless suits challenging a variety of state taxes and the
concomitant time-consuming factual inquiries.'1 8 The courts may thus
defer to the political process on most tax challenges, reviewing only
those taxes most likely to infringe commerce clause rights.
C. Paably Excessive Taxes
If the taxpayer meets his burden of production, he then may at-
tempt to show that the challenged tax is so excessive in relation to the
costs incurred by the state that free trade is unduly restricted. This
stage of the proceedings admittedly involves a degree of the valuation
process that the Supreme Court sought to avoid in Commonwealth
Edison." 9 It should again be noted, however, that rough approxima-
tions are sufficient at this point. The Court need not sift through volu-
minous evidence to decide which party's calculations are correct. Even
if the taxpayer succeeds in showing that the taxes paid appear palpably
in excess of the value of services provided, the burden of production
simply shifts to the state. The court has not been requested to establish
a proper tax rate or even accept as conclusive the calculations offered
by the parties. It must decide only whether there exists sufficient evi-
dence that the tax levied might be thought unfair. If the taxpayer fails
to create this doubt, he has not met his burden of proof, and the tax
must be upheld as constitutional.
D. The State's Burden of Proof
If the taxpayer convinces the court that the challenged tax might
be excessive, the state must then shoulder the burden of proving that
the process used to establish the tax rate and the costs considered were
likely to result in a proper tax levy. The court need not become im-
mersed in the feared battle of numbers, with each side hurling subjec-
tive valuations and expert testimony at the other. Rather, the state
need merely present evidence of a colorable, good-faith attempt to levy
a tax designed to cover the costs actually incurred by the state in pro-
118. Many challenges would be summarily resolved in favor of the state at this stage of the
proceedings, with minimal burden on the courts or cost to the states themselves. The majority of
those that remain would probably involve taxes on energy resources.
119. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. However, for a model outlining the compen-
sable services associated with severance taxes, see Note, An Outlinefor Development of Cost-Based
State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 913 (1980).
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viding services to the taxpayer.120 If the state proves this to the court's
satisfaction, the mandates of the commerce clause are met. It is true
that much latitude must be accorded to those cost valuations reflecting
"the advantages of a civilized society."' 21 Yet, the court's concern is
with distinguishing good-faith valuations from attempts to subvert the
restraints of the commerce clause. The scrutiny, therefore, would be of
the process leading to the challenged result, not the result itself. If that
process is. reasonably likely to reimburse the state only for the value of
the services provided, it is constitutional. The court would, in effect,
defer to the political process, reviewing taxes only to the extent neces-
sary to prevent commerce clause violations when that process is ineffec-
tive. 122 Furthermore, the nature of this review would in practice allow
courts to invalidate only those taxes well in excess of the value of serv-
ices provided.
IV. CONCLUSION
The states' taxing power must be restrained to preserve a fair rela-
tionship between taxes paid and the value of the services the state pro-
vides. A state's own political system usually provides adequate
120. Consideration of the "services" for which a state may levy a: compensating tax is beyond
the scope of this note. Yet, one particular service, if allowed, poses valuation problems because it
is not readily quantifiable, and therefore, warrants brief mention. The Supreme Court justified
the severance tax in Commonwealth Edion because "mining of the coal depletes the resource base
and wealth of the State, thereby diminishing a future source of taxes and economic activity." 453
U.S. at 624 (footnote omitted). Admittedly, this calculation adds ambiguity to the valuation pro-
cess and gives states more discretion in choosing a tax rate. Even so, the standard of review
advocated in this note should make the difficulty surmountable. See supra text accompanying
notes 119-20.
There are, however, two reasons why such a loss of wealth may not be compensable, despite
the Court's statement. First, the depletion of the state's wealth is not a "service provided," as the
Supreme Court has used the phrase in post-Complete Auto Transit decisions. Second, a tax
designed to compensate the state for such a loss would "serve only to advance 'simple economic
protectionism!" and would thus violate the commerce clause. New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 102 S.Ct. 1096, 1101 (1982). See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S.
1 (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
221 U.S. 229 (1911). Although New England Power concerned a state regulation prohibiting ex-
port of the state's resource, the rationale applies to taxes as well. A tax that compensates for lost
wealth is the functional equivalent of a regulation restricting export. In either case, the taxing
state has unconstitutionally hoarded a natural resource. See Note, The Effect and Validity of State
Taxation of Energy Resources, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 345, 357 (1980).
121. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
122. The proposed standard of judicial review is similar in many respects to the review cur-
rently given laws governing economic or social welfare when challenged on substantive due pro-
cess grounds. Under the substantive due process standard, the state must only show that the law
bears a rational relation to the end it is designed to achieve. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); J. NowAK supra note 3, at 408. See also supra note 70.
STATE RESO UR CE TAXES
controls, thus creating a presumption that taxes are fair and equitable
vis-A-vis state expenses. Yet political processes, both state and federal,
are generally ineffective safeguards when the challenged tax directly or
indirectly burdens energy-producing natural resources.
Although state taxes on energy resources constitute a small per-
centage of the total number of state taxes levied, their impact can be
significant when the resources move in interstate commerce, are used
primarily by nonresidents of the taxing state, and are subject to monop-
oly-like control by that state.12 The impact intensifies if states are per-
mitted to tax at will, restrained only by the formalistic requirement that
taxes relate to the taxpayer's contact with the taxing state. Taxpayers
and interstate commerce are then at the mercy of states with fortuitous
monopolistic control over resources consumed primarily outside the
state. Although interstate commerce must pay its own way,124 equity
and the implicit mandate of the commerce clause require that interstate
commerce not pay more than its just share.
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana the Supreme Court over-
looked the inherent shortcomings of the political process and the rela-
tive ease with which courts can conduct an adequate review. The
courts should accept their responsibility to maintain a reasonable bal-
ance between the states' right to tax and the nation's interest in unfet-
tered trade. The courts, therefore, must require that taxes on energy-
producing resources moved in interstate commerce be fairly related to
the state's cost of providing legitimate services. To adopt a lesser stan-
dard is to demote free trade to a status beneath that intended by the
drafters of the commerce clause, to the detriment of the nation as a
whole.
A Douglas Harmon
123. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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